This article presents research on the scale of the phenomenon of sexual violence against students at selected 33 universities across Poland, the mechanisms used to combat the problem and the awareness of students on the subject. The study focuses on the practical dimension of combating sexual violence against students in the Polish academic environment. It looks at the existence and functioning of both specialised bodies and the procedures used to help the victims and punish the perpetrators. Additionally, the paper describes (...) how the diversity of available legal measures to address the problem by both helping the victims and holding perpetrators accountable creates the issue of the coexistence of two systems—criminal and intra-university. Presenting preliminary results of gathered opinions of universities’ officials regarding functioning of the bodies specialised in combating sexual violence shows not only the most dominant observations and conclusions the professionals have regarding the functions they hold at their home universities, but also main challenges that have to be considered in both creating sufficient policies in order to deal with sexual violence and conducting comprehensive research on said phenomenon. (shrink)

Der Artikel zeigt dichterisches Schaffen vom Priester Wacław Buryła unter dem Gesichtspunkt die moderne Priesterpoesie. Der Text bespricht auch diese Richtung der Priesterpoesie als ungewöhnliches Literaturphänomen im Weltmaßstab.

The author refers to three authors, Anthony Burgess, Aldous Huxley and Stanisław Lem, who, when building their visions of a biologically ‘amended’ society, imbue them with their apprehensions of the psychological consequences of civilisation’s further development; the more or less voluntary limitation of the freedom of the individual, globalisation, the domination of ‘dumbed-down’ popular culture and advanced science and technology at the service of the ruling elite. The writers and the philosopher continually warned the reader that a combination of these (...) factors will result in the emergence of a new totalitarianism, a dictatorship disguised as an apparently permissive utopia. The author demonstrates how the writers in question are part of the pessimistic stream of reflection on humankind which dominated the Western thought of the mid-20th century and which found its fullest reflection in Erich Fromm’s Escape from Freedom. (shrink)

In Plato’s dialogue ‘Gorgias’, which is a polemic with rhetoric as an ability to choose the unfair, Socrates proves that it is better to experience the injustice rather than to cause it. A few centuries later, this idea was further exploited by a Roman Empire Stoic Lucius Annaeus Seneca, also called Seneca the Younger or Philosophus. The basic idea of Seneca’s political thought is hatred towards the tyranny and a simultaneous acceptance of a fair sovereign who can control his anger (...) and look after his country. Through his work Seneca is encouraging a just life that is in accordance with god’s laws. For him, justice is the core for the functioning of a society. Seneca also claims that human relations should be based on natural reasoning rules. (shrink)

This paper describes Confucian ceremonies and the objectives that were assigned to them in socio-political life and religious practices, as well as the artistic and spiritual journey aimed at self-realization.

„Fenomenologia: natura, znaczenie, ograniczenia” to przekład publikacji Bernarda J. F. Lonergana pt. „Phenomenology” nature, significance, limitations”. Tenże dwunasty wykład kanadyjskiego filozofia o fenomenologii traktuje o jej definicji, przedmiocie, naturze, znaczeniu i zasługach oraz związkach z innymi naukami. Wprowadza czytelnika w główne koncepcje tej szkoły filozoficznej i zapoznaje z autorami, dla których ten sposób myślenia jest charakterystyczny. Filozof w szczególności zwraca uwagę na to, iż jest to metoda badań, w której istotną rolę odgrywa wgląd. Warto zauważyć, że kategoria wglądu w epistemologii (...) Bernarda J. F. Lonergana — XX-wiecznego myśliciela i księdza filozofującego na pograniczu fenomenologii, tomizmu i hermeneutyki — jest kluczowa. Przekładu dokonała Dominika Dziurosz-Serafinowicz. (shrink)

Książka _Józef Tischner _opublikowana przez Wydawnictwo Naukowe Akademii Ignatianum w Krakowie w ramach serii „Polska Filozofia Chrześcijańska XX wieku” jest wieloautorską monografią napisaną pod redakcją Jarosława Jagiełły. Publikacja wprowadza czytelnika przede wszystkim w filozofię sławnego „księdza na manowcach” i autora popularnej _Historii filozofii po góralsku_, ale wzbogacona jest również w rys biograficzny tego myśliciela oraz zwraca uwagę na czasy, w których przyszło Tischnerowi żyć i filozofować, co w jego przypadku miało duży wpływ na tematykę, którą podejmował. Ponadto w wydaniu tym (...) znajdziemy wybór oryginalnych tekstów Tischnera z jego czołowych dzieł filozoficznych (wydanych jeszcze za jego życia), jak _Filozofia dramatu_, _Myślenie według wartości _czy _Spór o istnienie człowieka_. Głównymi autorami artykułów w monografii są ludzie, którzy poświęcili się studiom nad myślą tischnerowską – Jarosław Jagiełło oraz Mirosław Pawliszyn. Redaktor publikacji – Jarosław Jagiełło – nie tylko znał księdza Tischnera osobiście, ale dotąd pozostaje jego wiernym uczniem i kultywatorem jego myśli, która, na tle współczesnych filozofii, pozostaje niezwykle oryginalna. O tym, z jakimi tradycjami filozoficznymi Tischner natomiast polemizuje (tomizm, marksizm), oraz o tym, o kształt których koncepcji nieraz zacięcie walczy (odpowiedzialność, człowiek), pisze Miłosz Hołda. (shrink)

Współczesna nauka wymaga międzynarodowej kooperacji, której wynikiem jest synergia, jej efekty są łatwiej komercjalizowane, wspólne publikacje stają się lepiej rozpoznawalne przez społeczność naukową i częściej cytowane. Autorki artykułu omawiają wsparcie Fundacji na rzecz Nauki Polskiej w umiędzynarodowieniu polskiej nauki. Prezentują ufundowane przez nią międzynarodowe stypendia i nagrody oraz, z uwagi na tematykę tego numeru, szczegółowo omawiają współpracę polskich i francuskich naukowców w ostatnich latach.

Generalnie rzecz ujmując, prezentowana monografia pokazuje, że jej Autorka jest zdecydowaną przeciwniczką uprawiania filozofii tylko przy biurku z dala od problemów praktycznych. Swoich poszukiwań nie traktuje w kategorii realizacji akademickiego zawodu tylko zadania, związanego z podejmowaniem określonych działań, wpływających na zmianę postrzegania przez człowieka środowiska naturalnego. Postulaty upraktycznienia filozofii, a zwłaszcza etyki cnót, uprawiania jej w ścisłej współpracy z różnymi społecznymi interesariuszami są jak najbardziej słuszne i godne instytucjonalnego wsparcia. Książka ma niezaprzeczalnie walor perswazyjny. --------------- Zgłoszono: 19/11/2020. Zrecenzowano: 18/12/2020. Zaakceptowano (...) do publikacji: 09/02/2021. (shrink)

As a slew of recent work in epistemology has brought out, there is a range of cases where there's a strong temptation to say that prudential and (especially) moral considerations affect what we ought to believe. There are two distinct models of how this can happen. On the first, “reasons pragmatist” model, the relevant prudential and moral considerations constitute distinctively practical reasons for (or against) belief. On the second, “pragmatic encroachment” model, the relevant prudential and moral considerations affect what one (...) is epistemically justified in believing. The pragmatic encroachment model appears to have several advantages over reasons pragmatism, and this has led many recent philosophers to endorse the former. However, in this paper we argue that a version of reasons pragmatism can be (at least largely) saved from these purported disadvantages once paired with an independently plausible permissivism about epistemically justified outright belief. This hybrid view—“permissivist pragmatism”—holds that when there is more than one epistemically permitted doxastic attitude, practical (including moral) considerations can determine which epistemically permitted doxastic attitude one all-things-considered ought to have. This view avoids both the problems faced by simple versions of reasons pragmatism, and those that distinctively attend pragmatic encroachment, while preserving the advantages of each view. (shrink)

According to a traditional interpretation of Kierkegaard, he endorses a strong form of direct doxastic voluntarism on which we can, by brute force of will, make a “leap of faith” to believe propositions that we ourselves take to be improbable and absurd. Yet most leading Kierkegaard scholars now wholly reject this reading, instead interpreting Kierkegaard as holding that the will can affect what we believe only indirectly. This paper argues that Kierkegaard does in fact endorse a restricted, sophisticated, and plausible (...) version of direct doxastic voluntarism. On Kierkegaard’s view, when we take ourselves to be in an epistemically permissive situation, we have the ability to form outright beliefs (but not credences) at will in virtue of our ability to voluntarily 1) open or close inquiry and 2) determine our attitude towards epistemic risk. (shrink)

On the dominant contemporary accounts of how practical considerations affect what we ought to believe, practical considerations either encroach on epistemic rationality by affecting whether a belief is epistemically justified, or constitute distinctively practical reasons for belief which can only affect what we ought to believe by conflicting with epistemic rationality. This paper argues that Søren Kierkegaard offers a promising alternative view on which practical considerations can affect what we ought to believe without either encroaching on or (necessarily) conflicting with (...) epistemic rationality by determining which among the epistemically permitted outright doxastic attitudes one should all‐things‐considered adopt. (shrink)

Kierkegaard's pseudonym Johannes Climacus famously defines faith as a risky “venture” that requires “holding fast” to “objective uncertainty.” Yet puzzlingly, he emphasizes that faith requires resolute conviction and certainty. Moreover, Climacus claims that all beliefs about contingent propositions about the external world “exclude doubt” and “nullify uncertainty,” but also that uncertainty is “continually present” in these very same beliefs. This paper argues that these apparent contradictions can be resolved by interpreting Climacus as a belief‐credence dualist. That is, Climacus holds that (...) beliefs and credences (i.e., degrees of belief) are two irreducibly distinct types of mental states. Beliefs are resolutions that close inquiry, thereby excluding doubt and reflecting subjective certainty by disregarding the possibility of error. Credences, by contrast, reflect assessments of evidential probabilities, thereby encoding a recognition of “objective uncertainty” by acknowledging the possibility of error. In addition to solving a vexing interpretive puzzle and showing how Kierkegaard anticipates contemporary views about the nature of belief and credence, this paper demonstrates that Kierkegaard developed a sophisticated account of the nature of belief, doubt, and certainty that merits serious philosophical consideration. (shrink)

According to the thesis of doxastic wronging, our beliefs can non-derivatively wrong others. A recent criticism of this view claims that proponents of the doxastic wronging thesis have no principled grounds for denying that credences can likewise non-derivatively wrong, so they must countenance pervasive conflicts between morality and epistemic rationality. This paper defends the thesis of doxastic wronging from this objection by arguing that belief bears distinctive relationships to inquiry and blame that can explain why beliefs, but not credences, can (...) non-derivatively wrong. First, forming a belief (but not updating one’s credence) closes inquiry, and suspending judgment (but not updating one’s credence) opens inquiry. Consequently, beliefs can distinctively wrong others by prematurely closing inquiry or inappropriately opening inquiry. Second, beliefs (but not credences) can constitute blame. Unfittingly blaming someone can wrong them, and hence beliefs which constitute unfitting blame can distinctively wrong. In addition to defending the claim that only beliefs can non-derivatively wrong, this paper gestures towards an ethics of belief which attends to the relationship between belief and attitudes such as inquiry, faith, trust, and blame. (shrink)

Przełożyła Dominika Kosiewicz-Wawrzonkowska.

In locating friendly fire in contemporary philosophy of religion, D.Z. Phillips shows that more harm can be done to religion by its philosophical defenders than by its philosophical despisers. Friendly fire is the result of an uncritical acceptance of empiricism, and Phillips argues that we need to examine critically the claims that individual consciousness is the necessary starting point from which we have to argue: for the existence of an external world and the reality of God; that God is a (...) person without a body, a pure consciousness; and that to assent to a religious belief is essentially to assign a truth value to a proposition independent of any confessional context. When these products of friendly fire are avoided, we arrive at a new understanding of belief, trust and the soul, and refuse to say more or less than we know about the realities of human life in the service of religious apologetics. (shrink)

On religious life in Islam; conduct of life for Muslims and on Islamic ethics.